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Abstract
Recent advancements in Convolutional Neural Networks have yielded super-human
levels of performance in image recognition tasks [13, 25]; however, with increasing vol-
umes of parcels crossing UK borders each year, classification of threats becomes integral
to the smooth operation of UK borders. In this work we propose the first pipeline to ef-
fectively process Dual-Energy X-Ray scanner output, and perform classification capable
of distinguishing between firearm families (Assault Rifle, Revolver, Self-Loading Pistol,
Shotgun, and Sub-Machine Gun) from this output. With this pipeline we compare re-
cent Convolutional Neural Network architectures against the X-Ray baggage domain via
Transfer Learning and show ResNet50 to be most suitable to classification - outlining a
number of considerations for operational success within the domain.
1 Introduction
Dual-Energy X-Ray scanning systems are ubiquitous in border security applications, and
pose a substantial challenge for automation - requiring trained officers for successful opera-
tion. These technologies are employed for a wide range of logistical solutions for passenger,
commercial, industrial baggage and parcel services. With an ever increasing volume of
parcels, systems are put under pressure to classify complex contents in shorter time-spans
for detection of threats.
In recent years, significant advancements have been made in the field of Object Classifica-
tion and Detection, specifically through the yearly ImageNet( ILSVRC ) competition [25].
Whilst ILSVRC is designed for general object classification, there has been little work ap-
plying such advancements specifically to the security domain.
Existing work towards Dual-Energy X-Ray baggage object detection focuses on traditional
feature extraction, segmentation, enhancement, and detection algorithms to facilitate human
c© 2019. The copyright of this document resides with its authors.
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operators in the interrogation of baggage imagery. Turcsany et al [31] demonstrate a Vi-
sual Bag-of-Words model applied to 2D pseudo-colour images using DoG, DoG+SIFT, and
DoG+Harris feature representations, with expansions [5] on such work focusing on the use
of SURF [6] and SVM Classifiers - yielding improved classification results due to a large
diverse dataset. In addition, Flitton et al [11] propose 3D Computed Tomography (CT) im-
agery solutions extending on 2D methods via a combination of 3D Feature Descriptors -
Density Histogram(DH), Density Gradient Histogram(DGH), SIFT, and Rotation Invariant
Feature Transform(RIFT). Kechagias-Stamatis et al[17] outline a proposed pipeline relying
on local feature extraction via SURF features, utilising soft and hard clustering. Further
work has looked at enhancing image output as a means of improving object detection [7].
Akçay and Breckon [2] compare transfer learning within the domain of X-Ray Threat Detec-
tion on a limited-scope dataset comprised of disparate threats with various mechanisms such
as Sliding Window CNN, and recent region proposal-based architectures concluding these
approaches to be superior to hand-crafted features. Akçay et al. [4] continues this work - out-
lining datasets labelled Dbp2 and Dbp6 for firearm-not-firearm and mutli-class firearm/threat
classification respectively - whereby classification and detection mechanisms are compared
for both these datasets and classification is performed on Full-Firearm vs Operational Benign
(FFOB) and Firearm Parts vs Operational Benign (FPOB); confirming application of Con-
volutional Neural Networks to outperform hand-crafted features. However [2, 4] include
objects such as guns, knives, laptops as ’threat’ objects when performing classification.
Akçay et al. [3] compare the depth of representation freezing, when transfer learning, against
accuracy with a pre-trained AlexNet[18] model, showing benefits when freezing layers 1-3.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider various Deep Convolutional Neural
Network models, including more recent models, for the application of transfer learning to
this problem via a direct-from-scanner approach - where our dataset preprocessing enables
us to produce classification directly from X-Ray Scanner Output, on a dataset constructed of
5 similar firearms of distinct families.
1.1 Convolutional Neural Networks & Transfer Learning
Deep Convolutional Neural Networks have been applied to a host of domains since their
inception, including Video classification [16], Reinforcement Learning [19], Natural Lan-
guage Processing [10], and in recent years have surpassed human-level performance in im-
age recognition tasks [13, 26].
These networks provide a means of deeper image representation, where initial layers repre-
sent basic image features such as edges or boundaries, with further layers providing more
abstract representations such as faces; dependent upon the training dataset [32]. These repre-
sentations are then combined with fully-connected layers to weight which features contribute
towards the correct classification of a given class - often utilising softmax to provide class
probability outputs.
Successful classification typically relies on substantial numbers of training examples to
learn from, with ILSVRC containing upwards of 14 millions images over 1000 classes -
providing sufficient information to train CNNs from scratch. Evolution of Neural Network
architectures are producing more accurate classification accuracies on ILSVRC challenges,
yet for domains where training examples are scarce, or expensive to obtain, training from
scratch can be problematic or may lack sufficient data to adequately produce a model. Trans-
fer Learning [23] exploits the innate ability of CNNs to produce feature abstraction, and
WILLIAMSON ET AL.: FULL-WEAPON X-RAY THREAT DETECTION 3
applies this to a new domain not originally trained on, the target domain. This technique
has become popular across difficult training domains, and has been shown to work within
detection scenarios [21, 27]. Transfer Learning involves taking the weights of a given archi-
tecture, trained to a high degree of accuracy on an existing domain, and initialising a new
model with those same weights for a different domain, the target. This approach significantly
reduces training times by bootstrapping learning, and on occasion, prohibiting backpropaga-
tion into the earlier layers, focusing only on the final layers - fine-tuining. A variation upon
this approach freezes a sub-set of the convolutional layers, enabling fine-tuning of the mid
to high-level features [22]. Chollet [9] states that training required 3 days on the original
ILSVRC-2012 dataset, utilising 60 K80 GPUs; additionally Simonyan and Zisserman [28]
reported 3-4 weeks of training on NVidia Titan Black GPUs depending on the variant of their
architecture used. With Transfer Learning we can re-use the knowledge of these original do-
mains, and adapt them for Dual-Energy X-Ray Imagery within fractions of the time; when
compared against training a CNN from random initialisation.
2 Experimental
2.1 Dataset
We utilise a novel dataset provided by the Home Office’s Centre for Applied Science and
Technology (CAST), consisting of false-colour images of baggage items, where higher atomic
weights are represented via blue hues, corresponding to metallics, and orange hues represent
lower atomic weights, such as organic material; with greens being a mix of organic and
in-organic materials (See Figure 1). Data is comprised of fullweapon examples only, and
represents the following classes: assault rifle, revolver, self-loading pistol, shotgun, and
sub-machine gun with 2160 positive examples across all classes; containing 450, 450, 450,
360, and 450 examples per class, respectively. Each image belongs to an imagegroup, where
members of an imagegroup correspond to the same physical baggage being scanned from
multiple viewpoints; these include top-down, side-view, and ± 45 oblique, dependent upon
manufacturer. These are split into training and testing example sets, whereby no imagegroup
is bisected, with 70-30 ratio maintaining class distribution consistent across the set bound-
ary. It is worth noting that no selective filtering is done upon the dataset to remove erroneous
images, examples of which include distortion or empty images during image acquisition.
Image labels were provided as-is from CAST via metadata related to each file. Final train-
ing set contains 1524 fullweapons, with 318, 318, 318, 252, 318 examples over respective
classes; with the testing set containing 132, 132, 132, 108, 132 examples respectively.
Prior works have only sought to address a binary gun-not-gun problem, or a 6-class multi-
object problem. Our dataset includes more difficult cases where differences between classes
represent fundamental differences between specific gun families; whereby overlap of fea-
tures will be commonplace. In addition, our dataset includes significantly fewer examples
for this task.
To our knowledge, we are the first to consider sub-classes of firearm classification in this
context, specifically in an end-to-end manner.
4 WILLIAMSON ET AL.: FULL-WEAPON X-RAY THREAT DETECTION
Algorithm 1 Maximal information bounding
Require:
f unction inRange(i, l,u)− produces a 0, 1 output if a given pixel lies between the lower-
bound, l, and the upper-bound, u.
matrix Jn− unit matrix of nxn, composed of values 1.
f unction hsv(imbgr)− converting imbgr into HSV Colour Space.
f unction boundingRect(mask)− calculate minimum up-right bounding rectangle of
non-zero elements of mask.
f unction centroid(mask)− calculate the centroid of the given mask.
f unction padd(image, top,bottom, le f t,right)− Pads the provided image with whites-
pace, by the amount specified in the given four directions.
1: Bmin = (90, 100, 100)
2: Bmax = (180, 255, 255)
3: images = {im0, im1, . . . , imN}
4: c = {c0, c1, . . . , cN}
5: meanWindow = [0,0]
6: count = 0
7: for imhsv← hsv(imbgr) ∈ images do
8: maskhsv← inRange(imhsv,Bmin,Bmax)
9: morphMaskhsv← (maskhsv	 J3)• J10
10: cimhsv ← centroid(morphMaskhsv)
11: bRect← boundingRect(morphMaskhsv)
12: meanWindow += 1counter+1 · (bRect−meanWindow)
13: counter = counter+1
14: end for
15: for imhsv← hsv(imbgr),cimhsv ∈ images,c do
16: boundsx← (c[0],c[0]+meanWindow[0])
17: boundsy← (c[1],c[1]+meanWindow[1])
18: paddedhsv← padd(
19: image = imhsv,
20: top = bmeanWindow[1]2 c,
21: bottom = dmeanWindow[1]2 e,
22: le f t = bmeanWindow[0]2 c,
23: right = dmeanWindow[0]2 e
24: )
25: f inal← imhsv[boundsx[0] : boundsx[1],boundsy[0] : boundsy[1]]
26: save(resize( f inal, 12 ))
27: end for
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Figure 1: Example of false colour representation of Dual-Energy X-Ray Imagery.
(a) Assault Rifle (b) Revolver (c) Self-Loading Pistol
(d) Shotgun (e) Sub-Machine Gun
Figure 2: Training example images after maximal information windowing from 5
full-weapon categories. Prior to shorter-side cropping.
2.1.1 Preprocessing
Preprocessing consists of taking an output image from an X-Ray Scanner and processing
it ready for interpretation by the Convolutional Neural Network. The same steps taken
here apply for construction of the training dataset, as well as preprocessing of new images
for inference only. Preliminary HSV slicing, between (H = 90, S = 100, V = 100) and
(H = 180, S = 255, V = 255), to highlight high Effective Atomic Weight (Ze f f ) values, is
performed to segment metallic responses; positive threats within the dataset have high metal-
lic components. Secondly, morphology operations reduce any smaller erroneous responses,
as well as emphasise and focus on the primary cluster of high-response; representing the
actual threat. From this we denote centroid locations, and bounding boxes of responses in
order to calculate a mean response window, for which our network will be shaped to. The
intuition behind our approach is that high metallic responses will contain the maximal infor-
mation from the sample, and thus creating a minimum bounding box around these responses
will result in the highest likelihood of threat detection contributing to learning. This process
is outlined in Algorithm 1. As Convolutional Neural Networks containing fully-connected
layers require a fixed input size, it is important to choose an appropriate input size; we chose
the mean window response as an indication of aspect ratio - later resizing by 12 to reduce
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memory usage and complexity for processing. Examples of preprocessing output can be
seen in Figure 2.
As data provided consists of Multi-View Dual-Energy X-Ray images of baggage, it is im-
portant to ensure that those images which represent the same physical specimen be grouped
such that they entirely lie within either the training set, or the test set; due to high similar-
ity between images of the same image group. Therefore we employ an image group split
mechanism as a means of ensuring our training-test split is as close to ideal as possible -
70-30 training-testing split. We maintain class balance over the sets via this process, such
that the distribution amongst classes pre-split is as close as possible to the post-split, whilst
still adhering to imagegroup boundaries.
After splitting, the training set contains 1524 fullweapons, with 318, 318, 318, 252, 318
examples over respective classes; with the testing set containing 132, 132, 132, 108, 132
examples respectively. To utilise this dataset with the original networks we perform shorter-
side cropping to the two modes of input dimension, 224x224, or 299x299, when feeding the
network.
2.2 Framework
To enable a direct comparison, an evaluative framework was developed which encapsulates
each specific network, acting as an interface for standard training/testing operations. These
include building, training, testing, loading, and saving each network. Tensorflow [1], and
Keras [8] were used to realise this framework, with Keras providing a substantial num-
ber of the models with existing weights trained from the ILSVRC domain. AlexNet [18]
was originally under the Caffe framework [15], with the architecture obtained from Ten-
sorflow/Models Github [30] for Tensorflow with a conversion of the original weights being
provided by Michael Guerzhoy [12]. All other pre-trained weights were provided via Keras
implementations.
Models selected for comparison include AlexNet [18], VGG19 [28], ResNet50 [14], Incep-
tionV3 [29], and Xception [9]. We use colloquial nomenclature to enable reproducibility and
linking between implementation and theory; where VGG19 is equivalent to VGG Model D,
and ResNet50 is a Residual Network of length 50.
2.3 Training
Each model is built following the architecture outlined by their respective implementations,
whereby we perform shorter-side cropping of either 224x224 or 299x299, centrally resizing
to the target dimensions. We re-implement a standard top-layer on-top of each convolu-
tional neural network for the given classification task, consisting of ReLU [20] activation
functions, terminated by a softmax output. We apply a stop mechanism between the convo-
lutional layers and the redefined top-layers preventing any gradient calculation being propa-
gated backwards and modifying the weights of the earlier layers of the networks; facilitating
faster learning by reducing the number of trainable parameters calculated.
From the Model definition we use a Stochastic Gradient Descent Optimiser with lr =
1−3, momentum = 0.9, and decay = 1−4, with batchsize = 64 for all models. Batching is
done by randomly sampling from the given set, without replacement. Each epoch represents
a processing of all batches from the dataset. AlexNet model parameters [12] are loaded via
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TensorFlow, with top-layer weights and biases being initialised via truncated normal dis-
tribution with µ = 0.0, and σ = 0.001. Remaining models are initialised using ImageNet
weights provided by Keras for Convolutional Layers, with custom top-layer weights being
randomly initialised via glorot uniform distribution(Xavier uniform distribution), and zero
initialised bias units - as default.
Whilst training we use early stopping, such that if k consecutive epochs loss value does not
improve (minimise) we halt training and return the model with the lowest loss. We denote
an upperlimit = 3000 as our absolute upper-bound on number of epochs to train, and use
k = 50 for stopping.
Each model is trained on dual Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz CPUs, 8x16GB
Samsung DDR4 Registered DIMMs @ 2667 MT/s, with a single NVidia Titan XP GPU
with 3840 CUDA cores, running TensorFlow 1.4.0-rc1 compiled from source. Models were
trained in parallel, each with their own dedicated card; however sharing system resources for
CPU and RAM.
3 Results & Discussion
Average Inference time per image was calculated based on 500 iterations of the test-set, ob-
taining the time over all epochs, averaging over this sum, followed by division of number
of test samples within an epoch to obtain the average image response time. For Sensitivity
and Specificity calculations, these were conducted on a one-vs-all approach for each model,
calculated from the generated confusion matrices of each model.
Threat Detection algorithms do not work alone, and are typically part of a larger system;
This, in combination with an increasing volume of parcels and baggage being processed by
X-Ray scanning equipment, places a large emphasis on minimising processing time whilst
maintaining accuracy for successful operation. In order to evaluate the usefulness of each
network tested, for the domain of Threat Detection for Dual-Energy X-Ray systems, we pro-
pose the consideration of the following criteria: a) retrainability, b) high accuracy, c) reduced
parameters, and d) low inference.
The ability of deep learning to learn complex visual problems combined with a reduced
time-response to retraining are advantageous in a domain where the threat landscape is ever-
changing. The system must be robust to these introductions, and be able to quickly be
redeployed promptly following identification and acquisition of new threat information.
Detection of threats at border control has a direct impact upon the safety of the popu-
lation, the ability for the approach to classify weapons to a high accuracy is important and
should be considered safety critical; with misclassification or omission resulting in severe
consequences.
Reduced parameter count enables more images to be processed simultaneously by a sin-
gle GPU, prompting larger scan volumes due to reduced number of operations required.
Fewer parameters by the model need to be stored on the GPU, more room is freed up to
dedicate to data processing. In addition, fewer trainable parameters directly influences the
time taken to train the model sufficiently, as fewer gradients need to be calculated in a single
backpropagation pass. If the model can be initialised and ran utilising less GPU memory,
it directly results in cheaper implementation costs; using existing consumer-grade hardware
within scanning equipment.
As threat detection solutions do not operate in isolation but in tandem, low inference times
are essential to ensure that the impact of the threat detection pipeline as a whole is not im-
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peded; if classification cannot be performed in a timely manner this can cause reduction in
throughput of border control and distribution centres, and overall disruption.
From the overall results (See table 1) it can be seen that newer architectures have a trend
towards fewer parameters with the most recent, Xception, leading in this category. The ar-
chitecturally simpler networks of AlexNet, and VGG19 lend themselves to lower training
times, due in-part to their low inference times allowing higher throughput. We found con-
secutive stopping criteria to be the most effective when applying transfer learning, as the
loss function was relatively smooth - PQ Early-Stopping [24] was designed with more noisy
functions in mind, and was therefore not beneficial in our scenario and thus discarded. With
our previously defined stopping criteria ( See section 2.3 ) mechanism we achieve a best
training of 26.3 minutes for VGG19, with Xception taking 814.9 minutes of training. Whilst
the overall stopping time for ResNet50 is denoted as 111.47 minutes (See table 1), the test-
set accuracy plateaus relatively quickly (See figure 3) showing the reported training time as
an upper-bound, where highest-accuracy models, are saved and output significantly earlier
in the training process. With reference to Figure 3, training time for ResNet50 can be shown
to be comparable to VGG19, with both models having similar inference times of 4.7 and 4.2
respectively. Of models tested, AlexNet yields the lowest accuracy of 77.51% with the lat-
est models, InceptionV3 and Xception, performing with 81.13%, and 84.43% respectively.
Surprisingly the larger, more simple, VGG19 network out-performs these within this domain
with 88.68%. Overall ResNet50 produces the highest test-set accuracy of 91.04%, a 2.36%
improvement over VGG19. Of these networks both VGG19 and ResNet50 boast a low BER
per-class with a low of 5.01% and 3.35% respectively; other models produced BER typically
between 10 - 20%. Further metrics from each model can be seen in tables 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 -
with reference to table 2 for a reference key for the class id.
Table 1: CNN architectures with Parameters, Training Times (hours), and Average
Inference Times (ms) over 500 test-set runs, and test-set accuracy.
Model Name Number of Parameters Transfer Training Time (minutes) Average Inference Time Per Image (ms) Test-set Accuracy (%)
AlexNet [18] 111,443,342 70.40 1.35 77.51
VGG19 [28] 55,704,649 26.3 4.70 88.68
Resnet50 [14] 23,597,961 111.47 4.2 91.04
InceptionV3 [29] 21,813,033 370.1 6.27 81.13
Xception [9] 20,871,729 814.9 8.54 84.43
Table 2: Lookup table mapping Class ID to Full Weapon Category
Class ID 0 1 2 3 4
Category Assault
Rifle
Revolver Self-Loading
Pistol
Shotgun Sub-Machine
Gun
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Table 3: AlexNet per class classification metrics - each class is treated as a one-vs-all
approach.
Class TP TN FP FN Sens (%) Spec (%) Acc (%) BER(%)
0 110 470 34 22 83.33 93.25 91.20 11.71
1 90 462 42 42 68.18 91.67 86.79 20.08
2 97 489 15 35 73.48 97.02 92.13 14.75
3 86 516 12 22 79.62 97.72 94.65 11.32
4 110 464 40 22 83.33 92.06 90.26 12.30
Table 4: VGG19 per class classification metrics - each class is treated as a one-vs-all
approach.
Class TP TN FP FN Sens (%) Spec (%) Acc (%) BER(%)
0 122 491 13 10 92.42 97.42 96.38 5.08
1 113 496 8 19 85.60 98.41 95.75 7.99
2 109 497 7 23 82.58 98.61 95.28 9.41
3 96 504 24 12 88.89 95.45 94.33 7.83
4 124 484 20 8 93.94 96.03 95.60 5.01
Table 5: ResNet50 per class classification metrics - each class is treated as a one-vs-all
approach.
Class TP TN FP FN Sens (%) Spec (%) Acc (%) BER(%)
0 125 497 7 7 94.70 98.61 97.80 3.35
1 109 492 12 23 82.58 97.62 94.50 9.90
2 121 488 16 11 91.67 96.83 95.75 5.75
3 102 521 7 6 94.44 98.67 97.96 3.44
4 122 489 15 10 92.42 97.02 96.07 5.28
Table 6: InceptionV3 per class classification metrics - each class is treated as a one-vs-all
approach.
Class TP TN FP FN Sens (%) Spec (%) Acc (%) BER(%)
0 118 488 16 14 89.39 96.83 95.28 6.89
1 96 481 23 36 72.73 95.44 90.72 15.92
2 100 479 25 32 75.76 95.04 91.04 14.60
3 95 513 15 13 87.96 97.16 95.60 7.44
4 107 463 41 25 81.06 91.87 89.62 13.54
Table 7: Xception per class classification metrics - each class is treated as a one-vs-all
approach.
Class TP TN FP FN Sens (%) Spec (%) Acc (%) BER(%)
0 119 484 20 13 90.15 96.03 94.81 6.91
1 108 489 15 24 81.82 97.02 93.87 10.58
2 105 481 23 27 79.55 95.44 92.14 12.51
3 94 516 12 14 87.04 97.73 95.91 7.62
4 111 475 29 21 84.09 94.24 92.14 10.83
10 WILLIAMSON ET AL.: FULL-WEAPON X-RAY THREAT DETECTION
0 20 40 60 80 100
Time ( minutes )
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Te
st
 A
cc
ur
ac
y
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
Tr
ai
ni
ng
 L
os
s
ResNet
Test Accuracy vs Time
Figure 3: ResNet50 Training Accuracy/Loss vs Time(minutes)
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